Monday, 18 April 2011

The Art in Waste (D. Scott Brown)

Many years ago, while I was teaching at the University of Pennsylvania, I shared a class in urbanism with the landscape architects. One day, they invited a gardener to show us time-lapse photography of plants. She had photographed the growth of roses. One sequence then another moved from tender bud to splendid bloom. But after that? Suddenly I realised we were seeing only half the pattern. After bloom comes blight; the rose gets old, wilts, and dies. But the gardener could not face the process of wastage and death; for her, the picture ended with achievement.

Yet the cycle of nature is seed, bud, bloom, blight, death, rebirth, and another cycle. It is not a bad story. It figures in all life and in all human mythology, and it is the context for any discussion of human processes, including those of urban life and the growth of cities. During the 1950s, urbanists who had viewed the destruction of European cities by bombs, and the deterioration of American cities by the flight to the suburbs, took a cue from nature and called this urban wastage, "blight." As it spread, they began to reassess their notions of urban change, seeing the birth, death and regrowth of urban areas as part of the cycle of life. This view of the wasting process as set within the life cycle will be the backdrop to our attempt to consider the art in waste.

Denise Scott Brown
Las Vegas, 1972 (www.glamcult.com)
How do human beings see waste? We think of it as dirty. Dust is dry and relatively clean but garbage is wet and disgusting. Waste has disgusting connotations. Therefore, to pursue the relationship between art and waste, I will have to be indelicate. Imagine a baby who has escaped from a diaper full of faeces. If she has the chance, she will play with them. They are part of her and she loves them. But the mother will not survive. And nor will the society. We must deal with these faeces, because, realistically, they are related to disease. Yet when the child is controlled too much and without tact or knowledge, the result will be inhibition, particularly inhibition in artistry, because the need to play with waste is related to creativity. So a good mother will transfer this need; she'll get the child to play in the mud; to make mud pies or castles of sand; to do something in dirt that is safe. Therefore considering the art in waste means going back to the basics of human beings and their early training, and understanding that playing in dirt is tied to creativity.

Our definition of waste is culture based. An article in a previous Basurama publication [1] observed that a peasant would have a quite different outlook on cow dung from that of an urban person. This reminded me of a Cape Dutch farmhouse I visited in South Africa. The floor was made of cow dung. It was polished and it smelled fresh. Peach pits had been inserted into the dung and, when you walked on it, it felt like the softest rubber. Cow dung and peach pits were seen as valuable resources, not waste, in that society. African kraal houses have dung floors too, and Africans make sandals from old car tires. These form the soles, while inner tubes provide the straps. They are excellent for rough roads. And our definition is class based. Upper-class people tend to think of lower-class tastes and preferences as vulgar and wasteful, and we architects use the terms, "visual blight" and "visual pollution," to describe the physical expressions of commercial culture, particularly streets signs. But I think we are inaccurate. The analogy to chemical pollution is not supportable. Chemical substances can be proven to be harmful to health and their presence in particles per cubic centimeter can be measured in the air. But how do you measure visual pollution? What we define as visual pollution is often something we find ugly. Yet that thing may please someone else's taste or meet their need. We may merely be snobbish about things that look lower class to us.

Why am I here? First, because I feel that Basurama, in studying waste as an artistic resource, is on to a very interesting topic. They came to Robert Venturi and me because we had analysed hated phenomena: the Las Vegas Strip [2] and Levittown [3]. Las Vegas is the apotheosis of the commercial sprawl found on highways outside American cities, and Levittown is the suburbia of lower-middle-class people ­ the "ticky-tacky boxes" of the folk singer, Pete Seeger, built after World War Two, largely for returning veterans. To uppermiddle-class architects they are definitely someone else's house. We tried to learn from them; to see them with open minds and new eyes, perhaps to draw beauty from them.

Earlier, another Madrid group had approached us to contribute to an exhibition on plagiarism. We said, "No, because, ever after, people will accuse us of stealing other people's ideas." But they insisted and explained how they had used a bad word to describe an interesting and potentially good thing: the artistic influence that passes from one group to another. So we said Yes, because, after all, we had used the word "sprawl," in trying to analyze suburbia open-mindedly. Later they wrote again, asking us to listen to Basurama, who also use a bad word ­ from "basura," meaning waste ­ to describe something good, and whose position is in sympathy with ours. We found Basurama's request challenging. Then an architect I respect in Rome told me I was talking with some of the most interesting young architects in Europe. Other architects have thought that if we analysed Las Vegas we must be socially irresponsible. Those critics, mostly from an earlier generation, were unable to separate structure from content: for example, I love medieval Cathedrals, though I feel the religion they supported was barbaric. I don't have to believe in the religion to admire the buildings. And in the same way, I don't have to like gambling to study the urbanism of Las Vegas. Basurama have understood this and recognize the affinity of our ideas and social concerns to theirs.

But there's another route that brought me here. It started in Africa. As a child growing up in South Africa, my cultural life was dominated by England. Although no longer a colony, we were, culturally speaking, a colonial society. English expatriates around us told us our local reality was inferior to what they had in England. They looked in Africa for green landscapes like those of Surrey, and did not notice the beauty of our own dry, khaki-colored landscape. As a child I thought this was wrong. Why did my beautiful veld have to look like Surrey? So I became an African xenophobe, railing against the importation of other cultures ­ objecting maybe too much, because I now believe in multiculturalism.

My outlook was shared by many in Africa, where the artistic debate had to do with what Africa was and how we, as artists, should express African landscapes and cultures. In this context, African folk art was revered but African popular culture was seen as bad, and when African folk artists departed from their traditions and tried to encompass industrial Johannesburg, the purists were outraged. Yet I felt these folk responses, especially those that recycled industrial waste, were really interesting ­ much more so than the high artists' interpretations of African folk culture.

In essence, we were caught culturally between "ought" and "is" ­ between the "ought" of a far away country and the "is" of Africa. I believe that artists who see only waste in the "is" and listen too much to the "oughts" of a distant place risk losing their creativity. With this outlook I approached Las Vegas. I say mine is an African view of Las Vegas. It implies: Let's look at the everyday environment that surrounds us and see it as an artistic and cultural resource. And beyond that: Let's question the rules. If they come from another place or time, do they apply here, now?

In 1952, as an architectural student in my fourth year, I moved from Johannesburg to London and entered the Architectural Association Final School. I arrived in England during a period of great social change, resulting from post-World War Two social policies. The AA was split in several, mutually exclusive groups. On the one hand were students who had received major scholarships to study there and, on the other, the AA's traditional students from English public schools, who could afford to be there. I, as a colonial, could converse with either group and, whereas each looked disapprovingly on the mores of the other, neither had many standards for me.

Within this social turmoil, the most vital architectural debate was among those in the scholarship group. The New Brutalist architects, Alison and Peter Smithson, were interesting to them. The Smithsons came from the North of England, which was already to be "non-U," (not upper-class) as was said at that time; therefore they had an outsider's view ­ just as I, an African, had (and Rem Koolhaas, too, who had lived in Indonesia as a teenager.) So the Smithsons, my first husband, Robert Scott Brown, and I, and later Rem, arrived at the site of the metropolitan culture, the origin of our now divergent culture, with a different view ­ and maybe, thereby, clearer minds.

However, for the Brutalists, the debate was not between colonial and metropolitan cultures, as it had been in Africa, it was between working-class and upper-class society. The Smithsons threw out Le Corbusier's view of urbanism ­ the CIAM view. Working with Team 10, the European rebels against CIAM, they turned to life in the streets of poor city neighborhoods. In this, they heeded some English sociologists, who were calling on planners to understand how people lived in the East End of London, saying that those who had been bombed out of housing could not simply be moved to the suburban environment of the new towns. In low-income neighborhoods social connections and networks of family and friends protected them from the hardship of poverty. Their life on the streets was a support system.

The Smithsons at that stage talked about "active socioplastics." But when they found sociology was difficult to incorporate into design, they declared that sociologists should extend their discipline to meet the needs of architects. I told them that they should be the ones to extend, but they gave up. I kept trying.

Another Brutalist interest was in breaking the rules, in doing the opposite of what had been done, traditionally, in architecture. Their rebelliousness echoed my Africa-inspired need to question, and I have been interested in Mannerism, the architecture that breaks the rules, since that time. They were interested, too, in popular culture, particularly American pop culture. Along with Ian Hamilton and other members of the London Independent Group, they had evolved a proto-Pop Art movement in the 1940s, long before one emerged in America. Their turn toward Pop involved more rule-breaking, as they looked creatively at phenomena others saw as "kitsch" and "schlock."

The Brutalists were thinking, as well, of cycles of change in urbanism and architecture. This made them question Modern architecture's view of functionalism. Members of the Modern Movement, through their Neue Sachlichkeit (new objectivity) doctrine, had said: Forget 19th century architecture; look at the challenge of modern industry. By solving problems directly, without reference to aesthetics and the compositional rules of architecture, they believed they would come across solutions that were right for the project and the times. And this, despite the fact that the resulting architecture could look ugly ­ with jarring juxtapositions between, for example, the scale of places for industrial machines and that of places for people. The Modernists felt that, though they might, at first, hate the results of objective thinking, they would love them in the end, because the buildings were the way they had to be. However, rule-breaking was not to be arbitrary; good reasoning should determine what was done.

In our work, we have come to equivalent "good" solutions that looked incredibly ugly. I think these helped lead us to a new sensibility. Like the study of the everyday environment, they got us out of an aesthetic groove and into a new way of seeing, in line with the times and its evolving technology. Because I believe in this version of the Neue Sachlichkeit, I say I am a Modernist and a functionalist. But the definition of functionalism must change. For example, we should no longer see the first program or brief of the first client as the only activities to be accommodated in the building. In Venice, some housing has been in occupation since the 12th century, though the plumbing is not eight hundred years old, and the uses, even when still residential, have varied widely in that time. A palazzo might have been a dynastic family house and warehouse, then a bank, museum, or governmental agency, or even an apartment building. So, how then do you define function? There must be other definitions that allow for the need to accommodate changes of activities in buildings over time.

With my head full of the problems of Africa and Europe, I arrived in America, just as the civil rights movement was starting. For me, the New Left began in 1958 in the debates about urban social and racial conditions in the city planning departments at the Universities of Pennsylvania and Berkeley. I had come to the United States because I wanted to study urbanism. In Europe in those Post War years, this was the thing to do, if you were a young and talented architect. And America was the right place to do it. But Robert Scott Brown and I had a further reason: we were going back to Africa, to develop our ideas and projects there and to work for a better Africa. Then Peter Smithson recommended that we attend the University of Pennsylvania because Louis Kahn taught there.

When we arrived, we found to our amazement, that Kahn did not teach in the city planning department. How could this be? But our student advisor at Penn, David Crane, said that, if our aim was to work in Africa, we needed to study urban planning as it was taught at Penn. And he was right.

In our first semester we did no studio work, but took courses in urban sociology, urban economics, statistics, and housing as an economic discipline. During these studies we found that the architectural urbanism that had excited us in England was already old news and sat in our textbooks, and the subject matter of our courses was more interesting because it related to real urban conditions and problems, and was more in line with "active socioplastics." On our reading list for urban sociology were books the Smithsons had read about life in the London East End, and our professor, Herbert J. Gans, had completed similar research on the West End of Boston.

In planning school we learned the scandal of urban renewal ­ that through this government-supported program, the architects' dream for the redevelopment of city centers had become a nightmare for urban low-income residents. American images of renewal were the same as those in Europe, but the people who lived in the housing were the rich; and the poor, who had once lived on the site, were forced to squash up tighter in existing slums. That was one of the reasons for the start of the 1960s social movements, and it arose, in part, from what architects were designing in urban renewal. When I told a group of fourth year architecture students at Berkeley that they were potentially part of the problem, they were horrified. "What are you going to do about this?" they asked me. Some years before, at Penn, I had asked the same of my professor of housing, William Wheaton: "You describe this terrible problem but you show no solutions. What are you doing about it?" He said: "I don't know. What are you doing about it?"

His question has remained with me. What am I doing about this problem that I did not cause but inherited? What were the students doing about this problem that no one had told them about in the first four years of architecture school? In the 1960s, architects, when they considered the city, looked inwards, at architecture. They read Le Corbusier on the Ville Radieuse instead of examining the real city or reading in urban fields beyond architecture.

I say I am a circus horse rider; I ride two horses, architecture and planning. They are galloping in diverging directions, but I try to bring them together. I learned from planning school to consider urban reality, the "is" of the city, before propounding its "oughts." For example, Herbert Gans taught us the sociology of class structure in America. My old Communist professor at the AA, Arthur Korn, used to say, "We are all workers." When I repeated this to Gans (who, like Korn, was a German refugee) he replied that architects had the lifestyles and tastes of the upper-middle class. How could we proclaim solidarity with the workers without understanding their needs, as they saw them? Gans complained that architects who worked as urban physical planners and saw themselves as experts, did not have training in urban social issues and did not understand that, as planners, they should respect other people's tastes and values. Planners in a democracy should know that, in a city, there are people of diverse cultures and different tastes and that their views should be heard.

Penn's planning professors recommended that we architects visit cities of the American Southwest, those that people flocked to because they enjoyed themselves there. We should try to understand what people loved in these cities ­ qualities lacked by the places architects created. That was one of our reasons for going to Las Vegas.

My first studio at Penn was on a very different topic. It was a new city for Chandigarh. The professor, David Crane, adopted Le Corbusier's program, but asked us to consider the new city from the viewpoint of rural peasants, who had migrated there and who depended on urban cast-offs and waste to survive. What could a city with little money afford to give them? With guidance from Crane, we decided that the most affordable and appropriate urban infrastructure was drainage. In a monsoon climate this would provide dry places on which they could build their houses.

Another concern of Penn's planners was planning for change, and how to do it when the nature of the change cannot be predicted. For example, it's easier to forecast with accuracy the population growth of a nation, for a given time period, than to predict how much a city will expand into one suburb at its outskirts, during that period. A solution frequently proposed to our inability to know the future is to build for a forecast at the midpoint between the high and the low projections. But this solution for one point will be wrong for all others. An approach that builds in flexibility would be more appropriate. Lynch, in an article, titled "Environmental Adaptability [4],"proposed planning for change per se, without predicting what the change would be. He discussed several ways of doing it. One was to leave enough room for different things to happen. But that is expensive. Another was to design a building with ample structural support and wide column bays that could accommodate a range of types and densities of activity. If it were possible, as well, to separate the structural and mechanical systems from the spaces intended for use, then changes in activities would not be impeded by building systems. Lynch's thought provided a basis for the consideration of urban as well as architectural change.

Along with studying social issues and urban change, planners were also learning to approach the city as a set of systems. In the 1950s computers were being adapted from military to urban uses. Computer technologies were applied, first, to studies that combined urban regional economics and transportation, both subjects that lent themselves to statistical analysis. I attended several courses on computers and computer-based urban theory in the early sixties because I sensed that the regional transportation studies were becoming very complex and were no longer understandable to traditional planners, especially in those days of extremely large, main-frame computers. Yet I saw that, as they worked, the researchers made assumptions about urbanism that were at least as over simple as those made by architects; one of the worst was that any factor that was not subject to measurement could be ignored.

There were also educated and creative people in the systems fields, who were well aware of the importance of including phenomena that weren't manageable by their methods. Such researchers understood the value of traditional urban planning methods and the use of human judgement and experience. But I worried about the computer's zealous neophytes, and I wanted to learn enough to be able to catch and point out their stupid first assumptions. Key for designers and humanists in planning was, I believed, that we openmindedly welcome the computer for what it could do but not lose our judgement in face of it. Thanks to the evolving mathematical models, we could gain a complex understanding of the city as a set of overlaid systems. And our particular province as architects and urban designers could be to consider how to draw artistry from the juxtapositions of systems ­ perhaps especially from their points of conflict and breakdown.

This view helped me to focus my interest in Mannerism on the city. If Mannerism was a way of breaking architecture's rules, in urban design it was breaking the rules of the various urban systems. This was inevitable because, in the city, there are so many systems, each with its own rules, and many are in conflict with each other. But the juxtapositions and conflicts between urban systems can be beautiful, and the wastelands they sometimes create are potentially places of freedom and challenge, for urban populations and for deft urban artists.

When Robert Venturi and I met in 1960, we shared an interest in Mannerism, and he soon began to understand my fascination with popular culture and the everyday urban landscape. We watched enthusiastically as American Pop artists began to put "waste" into a new context; for example, to place a Campbell's soup can in a museum. The Pop artists discovered new "found objects." Modern artists of the early Twentieth Century had their objets trouvés. Henry Moore looked to primitive sculpture and objects in nature such as water-worn pebbles, while early Modern architects scoured industry, finding in its silos and chimneys cubist shapes that intrigued them. Bob and I, having been taught by the Modernists to look and learn in unusual places, found our sources in history and in the everyday city ­ with some help from the Brutalists, the Pop artists and several social thinkers. Much of our inspiration lay in the everyday commercial and residential environments of suburban sprawl. Its archetypes, the Las Vegas Strip and Levittown, were our new found objects.

Lynch's last book, Wasting Away [5], is more poetic and philosophical than his other writings. He talks about waste on many levels. He is shocking: he uses words not usual to print, and he certainly gets our attention. Lynch refers to the need to "waste well." For us, this involves considering cycles of birth and death, and the concept of recycling ­ the reuse of old things for new purposes, as in the rehabilitation of buildings for new uses. The preservation movement is popular and powerful today, but a first question should be: to preserve or not? We should not always preserve. Venturi points out that no Renaissance palace was built on a parking lot. Many were erected on the sites of destroyed medieval buildings. At times we must destroy, at others save, depending on the situation. Then, when we preserve, we must decide on the period to be favoured. Returning to a medieval beginning in Europe, or an 18th century beginning in America, may destroy a beautiful 1930s storefront. So the decision on which time period or periods to preserve should be a situationist one, and preservationists who take too puristic an approach can lay waste to structures and create a dull and limiting environment, one that has been "preserved beyond repair." This will bring the need for further change. And the preserved city, if it is still a real city, will remain forever subject to pressures for change. If these are great, ersatz preservation can result, in which the semblance of history is maintained but not its meaning. For these reasons, Barbara Capitman, the great preserver of the Miami Beach Deco District, used to say "preservation is so temporary."

We can also think of the reuse of old ideas. A palimpsest is a text that covers an earlier text. Go beneath the first and you find the second. We architects, before computers, knew some palimpsests well. They were our working drawings, done in pencil on velum paper. If a design detail changed we changed the drawing, and if it changed again we erased and drew over once more. The list of revisions appeared in the title block, and each time you erased you revealed white lines etched where drawing had been before. There are also urban palimpsests. Under Renaissance Rome is medieval Rome and, under that, Early Christian and Roman Rome. Remnants and traces of all Romes are in modern Rome. In most cities we live on palimpsests, but on the Las Vegas Strip of the 1960s there was only the recent commercial vernacular architecture and the desert.

hen there is morphology, the study of form as a result of process. Urban and industrial technical processes have been important to urban morphology in all eras, and their accompanying processes of waste and recycling are particularly relevant and a major challenge today. When urban technologies change, new types of waste are created and there is demand for new types of recycling. Electronic technologies create virtual waste. Press the "delete" button and you have created waste. But someone going through my delete files would learn a great deal, and Basurama's interested in the creative use of virtual waste shows they are on to new ways of "wasting well."

Another concept is, "paleotechnology [6]," meaning the use of an older or more primitive, but appropriate, technology: old car tires for new shoes, for example. This is common in the Third world, where people must make do with what they have or substitute for what they have lost. Cubans creatively use waste in the maintenance of their old American cars for which there are no new parts. The driver of a taxi that has lost its cab light replaces it with a bulb set in a yellow plastic soap powder bottle, and day and night you still recognize the familiar symbol for a taxi.

There is also "satisficing," the notion of the economist, Herbert A. Simon [7]. Traditional economic models assume that all people have all the information needed to make a decision and are uniformly and perfectly rational. Simon's model assumes that people must decide within a limited time and on the basis of imperfect information. The Taxi Game is one example of satisficing: while you are deciding, the taxi meter is running; so you make the best decision you can with the money you have. Limits on efficiency or rationality are accepted as inevitable in the process.

The concept of "wasting well" implies these more inclusive views on technology and on the management of unmeasurables. However, Lynch does not go further and take up the artistic possibilities of waste and wasting. This is what I have aimed to do here. In 2005 I was on an architectural jury for some talented students at Tsinghua University in Beijing. I asked one young woman whose scheme I had admired what her major was, and she replied waste water management. I was surprised: it sounded very dull. So I asked whether she was studying waste water management as an engineering discipline, and she answered, No, as an artistic discipline.

This is what Basurama is talking about. When Basurama came to us they did not know the background I have described above, and all the approaches I would therefore take to waste, but they felt our Learning from Las Vegas study could be an example of a creative view on the subject. I agreed, adding that, in fact, cultural, social, and methodological concerns as well as artistic interest, had led us to examine the cities of the Southwest.

But why Las Vegas? Because it was the archetype, not the prototype. It was the clearest example; its signs were bigger, its context simpler. There was no Colonial or 19th Century city between the Strip and the desert. In Los Angeles, the greatest and most extensive example of the automobile city, there was already an earlier pattern, the railroad city. In Las Vegas we could measure a pure phenomenon.

The purpose of our studio project, from which Learning from Las Vegas derived, has been recently outlined by Karin Theunissen:

"This studio was entitled `Learning from Las Vegas, or Form analysis as design research' and was introduced as `a study that will help to define a new type of urban form emerging in America..., that from ignorance, we define today as urban sprawl.' The object of the study is given as `to understand this new form, and to begin to evolve techniques for its handling...'. From this we understand that Learning from Las Vegas is a study in observation of the form of the city, followed by the recording, analysis and processing of the data `to be made useful as design tools for urban designers.' The original publication contains marginal notes in bold text referring to aspects of the technical analysis, such as `This has been a technical studio. We are evolving new tools: analytical tools for understanding, new space and form, and graphic tools for representing them [8].'"

For us, Las Vegas was not only to be studied as signs. We wanted to learn, through it, about taste cultures, popular culture, folk and pop art, urban processes and systems, urban mapping, and the uses of history. By travelling metaphorically from Rome to Las Vegas and back to Rome, we tried to tie the present to the past, and to fold the everyday landscape into both the tradition of architecture and our modern experience. The Modernists had pulled away from tradition; we hoped to make architecture one again. And yes, we wanted to learn about signs and iconography; about how Las Vegas communicated with people in cars, as they travelled the Strip at 50km an hour. Later we realized that Las Vegas had taught us a major lesson on the role of communication and symbolism in architecture. This aspect of design had been ignored by Modern architects, even as they incorporated a high level of symbolism into their designs ­ symbolism about industry and the changing world.

We studied Las Vegas and Levittown in the service of our art. As doers and makers, our aim in looking at cities and reading about them was to improve our performance as architects and urbanists by augmenting our skills and tools. Translating ideas from other fields ­ the process that stumped the Smithsons ­ has been one method. We have looked for ideas that lead to building, and for similes and metaphors that can help us evoke physical designs from verbal concepts in logical and creative ways. In Architecture as Signs and Systems for a Mannerist Time [9], I have tried to explain some of the concepts and to demonstrate their operation in our work. Perhaps now, near the end of our careers, the body of that work can show what we learned from Las Vegas.

If, in our work, we made mud pies in Las Vegas, it was for both artistic and moral purposes. In stressing the "is" and the everyday, we tried to bring imagination to bear on the often agonized reality of cities. In consecrating waste, the most secular of items, and seeking an uncommon beauty in its grit and glitter, we have hoped to discover an appropriate architecture for our times. By taking this approach, we continue the Modernist tradition, operating within the early Moderns' philosophies but adapting them to new conditions.

Now Basurama is adjusting these ideas once again for their own time. As a result of their effort, the task of perpetually rediscovering Modern architecture ­ of establishing its new centre in a changing world ­ must now include a wide-eyed, open-minded visit to the waste dump.

Lecture for the Urban Distortions course, Basurama06.
La Casa Encendida. Madrid, the 4th of May 2006.


Notes

1. Feduchi, Pedro. "Outlook on trash" in Basurama, Madrid: La Casa Encendida, 2005, p. 74.

2. Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown y Steven Izenour, Learning from Las Vegas, MIT Press, Cambridge: 1972; revised edition 1977.

3. "Remedial Housing for Architects, or Learning from Levittown," a studio given at Yale School of Architecture in 1970. The studio work topics were published in, Venturi, Scott Brown and Associates: On Houses and Housing, London: Academy Editions, 1992; pp. 51-57. A further development of the Levittown study was illustrated in the "Home" section of the "Signs of Life: Symbols in the American City" exhibition, held in Renwick Gallery of the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C. in 1976. See also VSBA Bibliography, on-line at www.vsba.com.

4. Kevin Lynch."Environmental Adaptability," AIP Journal 24, no. 1 (1958). It Well, San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1990.

5. Kevin Lynch, Wasting Away. An Exploration of Waste: What it is, How It Happens, Why We Fear It, How to Do it Well. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1990.

6. Victor Papaanek, Design for the Real World: Human Ecology and Social Change, New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1972.

7. Herbert A. Simon, MDesign for the Real World: Human Ecology and Social Change , New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1972.

8. Karin Theunissen, "Re-building as Urban Tactic, Examining Venturi Scott Brown and Associates' transformation from within the American campus," The Architecture Annual 2004-2005, Delft University of Technology, 2006.

9. Robert Venturi and Denise Scott Brown, Architecture as Signs and Systems for a Mannerist Time, Part II, "Architecture as Patterns and Systems, Learning from Planning," pps. 105-217.. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004.

Tuesday, 12 April 2011

Fashion & Kitsch (R. Poggioli)

"The chief characteristic of fashion is to impose and suddenly to accept as a new rule or norm what was, until a minute before, an exception or whim, then to abandon it again after it had become a commonplace, everybody's 'thing.' Fashion's task, in brief, is to maintain a continual process of standarization: putting a rarity or novelty into general and universal use, then passing on to another rarity or novelty when the first has ceased to be such. In the sphere of art, we may express this phenomenon by saying that fashion tends to translate a new or strange form into acceptable and imitable dorms and then tu submit some other form to analogous metamorphoses and conversion as soon as the first has been made diffuse and common enough to have turned into what the French call poncif (stencil) and what we might anglicize as ‘stereotype’.

According to Baudelairse's clever paradox, the chief task of genius is precisely to invent a stereotype. We do not have to be reminded that genius is an exquisitely romantic concept, but the modernity of the stereotype is worth emphasizing. The tacitly enunciated task of classic art was the splendid repetition of the eternal maxims of ancient wisdom; impossible, then, for it to conceive the commonplace pejoratively. But since the triumph of the romantic cult of originality and novelty, the aesthetic equivalent of the commonplace has come to be more and more pejoratively considered. That is exactly why the stereotype is a wholly modern concept; by virtue of that modernity there exists, despite any contrary appearances, a connection between the avant-garde and stereotypes. Clement Greenberg in fact tried to establish the existence of such a connection in a Partisan Review article many years ago. He juxtaposed the concepts of avant-garde and of kitsch (the German synonim for the French poncif - if poncif or stereotype signifies the vulgarity of a theme, kitsch underlines the mediocrity or banality of a particular work of art). Greenberg established the connection on a level which was not purely critical o literary. As a leftist critic he maintained that avant-garde and kitsch were the cultural fruits, one as bad as the other, of a unique social, economic, and political situation; aquivalent and parallel results, in the field of art, of the same stage of evolution or, better, the same phase of decadence in bourgeois and capitalistic society. We might sum up Greenberg's position [...] by saying that the coinciding of avant-garde and kitsch shows that we are dealing with a Civilization now unable to produce a Kultur."

R. Poggioli (1962 [1968]) The Theory of the Avant-Garde. pp 79-80
Cambridge, Harvard University Press.

Saturday, 9 April 2011

Habitus

“Una classe o una frazione di classe si definisce non solo attraverso la posizione nei rapporti di produzione che può venir individuata mediante indicatori quali la professioni, il reddito o anche il livello di istruzione, ma anche attraverso una determinata proporzione tra i sessi, una determinata distribuzione nello spazio geografico (che, dal punto di vista sociale non è mai neutro), e mediante tutto un insieme di caratteristiche ausiliarie che possono fungere, come esigenze sottintese, da principi effettivi di esclusione o di selezione, senza venir mai formalmente enunciati (è il caso, per esempio, dell’appartenenza etnica o sessuale); molti criteri ufficiali funzionano in effetti da copertura a criteri nascosti, dato che il fatto di esigere un determinato titolo di studio può essere ad esempio un modo per esigere di fatto una determinata provenienza sociale” (Bourdieu, 2001; 104)

Habitus di classe: Principio unificatore e generatore di diversi pratiche; forma incorporata della condizione di classe e dei condizionamenti da essa imposti. (Bourdieu, 2001; 103)

“The anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu saw this clearly. Everyday life is not a system of representations or performances, he wrote, but a "system of structured, structuring dispositions ... which is constituted in practice and is always oriented toward practical functions”. He called this system the habitus, or practical sense. "Practical sense is a quasi-bodily involvement," he went on. It is "converted into motor schemes and body automatisms" (66, 69). […]the habitus is only a predisposition, "a present past that tends to perpetuate itself into the future," a way to proceed lodged in an actor capable of thinking and making judgments, so that in "the necessary yet unpredictable confrontation between the habitus and an event," new solutions are improvised. As both a sensorimotor and an ideological quality, the habitus is a flexible disposition that allow one to act in a way that is at once habitual and improvisatory, rote and novel. It is above all an "art of inventing" (54-56). And so we arrive at a more concrete sense of the everyday, in every sense of the word. One definition of everyday life might be "The nexus of spaces and times that repeatedly trigger bodily habits and cultural memories-the habitus." Everyday life can be oppressive or liberating, depending on the ways it is organized temporally and spatially. Everyday life shapes selfhood and personhood through material, and particularly bodily, practices, but its critical quality is time, as Michel de Certeau realized. It is the repetition and routine of everyday life that teaches our bodies the habitus.(Upton 2002, 719-720)

“Spazio fisico e spazio sociale fanno parte della stessa ‘trama che connetta’ l’uomo al suo ambiente. Si tratta di due dimensioni che si compenetrano reciprocamente: spirali di senso legano l’una all’altra. Non esistono dicotomie. Non c’è una cosa che agisce sull’altra, piuttosto incontri, interpenetrazioni, corrispondenze, reciprocità di dimensioni coesistenti. È dunque necessario intraprendere percorsi interpretativi in grado di assumere come irrinunciabile la complessità e la multidimensionalità dello spazio. Uno spazio sfaccettato e poliedrico in cui se mescolano: spazio sociale e spazio simbolico (Bourdieu 1995); conoscenza, potere ed eterotopie (Foucault 1994); pratiche spaziali, rappresentazioni dello spazio e spazi della rappresentazione, altrimenti declinati in spazio percepito, spazio concepito e spazio vissuto (Lefebvre 1991); spazi del margine, antagonisti e incubatori di pratiche antagoniste (Hooks 1998).” (Attili 2008, 57)

“Issues of identity and consumption converge in the concepts of ‘taste’ and ‘lifestyle’, that is, systems of practices through which individuals classify themselves by their classification of consumer goods as more or less desirable, acceptable or valuable (Bourdieu 1984) […] knowledge of status codes, or rules of legitimacy, allows consumers to display ‘good’ taste and thus establish their distinction. […] tastes for specific kinds of consumer goods are implicitly socialized by social class and status or are consciously learned as means of integration into new social groups.” (Zukin y Smith Maguire 2004, 181)

“In order for a certain formation to have an expressive power, it should originate from the cultural experience of a people--from their soul. This is the ultimate origin of art. The artist is the creative imagination of this soul.” (Mitias 1999, 76)

Attili, Giovanni. Rappresentare la città dei migranti. Milano: Jaca Book, 2008.
Bourdieu, Pierre. La distinzione. Critica sociale del gusto. Bologna: Il Mulino, 2001 [1979].
Mitias, Michael H. «The Aesthetic Experience of the Architectural Work.» Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1999: 61-77.
Upton, Dell. «Architecture in Everyday Life.» New Literary History, V 33 Nº 4, 2002: 707-723.
Zukin, Sharon, e Jennifer Smith Maguire. «Consumers and Consumption.» Annual Review of Sociology, V30, 2004: 173-197.

Sunday, 6 February 2011

What Happens in Vegas (P. Goldberger)

Can you bring architectural virtue to Sin City?

In 1965, a hotel owner named Jay Sarno began construction on a new hotel on the Las Vegas Strip, and decided to set his creation apart from the competition by modelling it on a Roman palace. Caesars Palace was really no different from any other big hotel, but the Roman arches and columns stuck on its façade, not to mention the tunic-clad cocktail waitresses inside, were such a hit that the place spawned a generation of imitations, each aiming to outdo the last in eye-popping extravagance. Las Vegas became the world’s largest theme park, with hotels intended to make you feel that you are in Venice, or Paris, or Egypt, or New York, or Bellagio, or on a pirate’s island, or among King Arthur and his knights. Or—given that these weird simulacra have become famous in their own right—that you are, quite simply, in Vegas. Sarno’s palace was vulgar and crude, but his achievement is one that even the most accomplished architects can only envy: he defined a city’s style.

But it’s been clear for a while that Las Vegas has been running out of themes. The trouble is that its effects rely entirely on dazzlement, an over-the-top gigantism that gets old fast. By this point, you could do a hotel that reproduced Angkor Wat or the Aztec city of Tenochtitlan and no one would raise an eyebrow. [...] And in 2004, when the hotel company MGM Mirage (now known as MGM Resorts International) was looking for a way of filling in a sixty-six-acre site between two of its properties on the west side of the Strip (the Bellagio and the Monte Carlo), it hit on the idea of turning the plot into a showcase for modern architecture.

The complex is called CityCenter, and it is the biggest construction project in the history of Las Vegas. It has three hotels, two condominium towers, a shopping mall, a convention center, a couple of dozen restaurants, a private monorail, and a casino. [...] the project contains nearly eighteen million square feet of space, the equivalent of roughly six Empire State Buildings. [...] There are major buildings by Daniel Libeskind, Rafael Viñoly, Helmut Jahn, Pelli Clarke Pelli, Kohn Pedersen Fox, and Norman Foster; and interiors by Peter Marino, Lewis Tsurumaki Lewis, Bentel and Bentel, and AvroKO. There are also prominent sculptures by Maya Lin, Nancy Rubins, and Claes Oldenburg and Coosje van Bruggen. “The idea I wanted to convey was to bring smarter planning to the development process in Las Vegas, to expand our boundaries of knowledge,” Murren told me. “Las Vegas is always looked down upon. CityCenter is a counterpoint to the kitschiness.”

But whether Las Vegas wants to be rescued from kitsch remains to be seen. [...]

The developers are counting on these modern buildings to have the same visceral impact that visitors to Las Vegas are used to getting from make-believe historical architecture, or from Trump-style glitz. They don’t. [...] the underlying risk of the CityCenter project is that good buildings next to outlandish ones will look quiet and bland. Caesars Palace and its progeny are crass but iconic. The CityCenter buildings are sophisticated, but you wonder, finally, if they are all that memorable.

Even though there is more density to CityCenter than there is to anything else in Las Vegas, and more sophistication to its architecture, it doesn’t feel urban. [...] Indeed, as you drive around the site, you suddenly wonder if CityCenter only appears to be different from the rest of the Strip. After all, cutting-edge contemporary architecture by the likes of Libeskind and Foster has been migrating steadily into the cultural mainstream for years. Now, perhaps, it has reached the point where it is familiar enough, and likable enough, to be just another style available for imitation, like the Pyramids or Renaissance Venice. CityCenter is the Las Vegas you already know, but in modernist drag.

The Sky Line, “What Happens in Vegas,” The New Yorker, October 4, 2010, p. 95

Read more




The CityCenter development, on the Las Vegas Strip, attempts to provide an alternative to the city’s garish architectural pastiches. Photograph by Robert Polidori.

Sunday, 30 January 2011

On Kitsch and Sementality (Robert C. Salomon)

http://cdiannezweig.blogspot.com
As the notion of "truth" requires "falsity," the very notion of "taste" in art necessitates the existence of "bad taste" and, consequently, bad art. But bad art, like falsehood, comes in many varieties and is subject to different kinds of objections. There is sheer technical incompetence, just to begin with (although artistic inability as such is much less fatal than it used to be); there is ignorance of the medium, the tradition and its history, the current fashions and the tastes of the times. For those outside the bustling art centers, what seems to be bad art may be just bad timing. There is unimaginative imitation and straightforwardp lagiarism. There is such a thing as having "no eye," the failure to understand color or composition. But there is also an "ethical" dimension to bad art, as in the depiction of the forbidden, the blasphemous, the vulgar expression of the inexpressible, the provocation of the improper and cruelty. [...]

Once upon a time, bad art was, above all, such use of unacceptable subject matter, evoking the wrong emotions and provoking the wrong reactions (e.g., visceral disgust and nausea)- but this too seems to have recently dropped out of the picture. These days, it is far wiser for an aspiring young artist to offend or disgust the viewer rather than evoke such gentle sentiments as sympathy and delight.

So this is just what is particularly interesting, from a philosophical point of view, about that peculiar variety of "bad art" called "kitsch," and, in particular, that variety of kitsch sometimes called "sweet kitsch. " Sweet kitsch is art (or, to hedge our bets, intended art) that appeals unsubtly and unapologetically to the softer, "sweeter" sentiments. [...] Examples of sweet kitsch are often mentioned as paradigm instances of bad art, but
the nature of its "badness" is just what makes kitsch philosophically interesting. [...]

What is wrong with sweet kitsch? Its deficiencies appear to be just what we would otherwise think of as virtues, technical proficiency and a well-aimed appeal to the very best of the viewer's emotions.

What is wrong with sweet kitsch, first and foremost, seems to be its sentimentality, its easy evocation of certain "sweet" emotions. But what is wrong with sentimentality,a nd sentimentality in art in particular? I think that the heart of the problem lies in our poor opinion of the motions in general and in particular the "softer" sentiments. [...]

By the end of the [19th] century, "sentimentalist" was clearly a term of ridicule and abuse, connoting superficiality, saccharine sweetness and the manipulation of mawkish emotion. Kitsch was its artistic equivalent, and artists in Paris who had been praised only a century before as the "geniuses" of Official Art became figures of loathing and ridicule in retrospect, mere curators of kitsch who produced paradigms of "bad art" which we keep in our museums only for the sake of the historians, and as contrasts to the great art of the "Refused" in the room next door. [...]

To call someone a "sentimentalist" in ethics is to dismiss both the person and his or her views from serious consideration, adding, perhaps a disdainful chortle and an implicit accusation of terminal silliness. Sentimentality is roundly condemned in the arts as well, and to call a piece "sentimental" or "kitsch" is to say that it is very bad art-if, indeed, it deserves recognition as art at all-and to cast suspicion on both its creator and its appreciative audience. [...] Kitsch and sentimentality lead to brutality. Sentimentality and kitsch reveal not only woefully inadequatea esthetic sense but a deep moral flaw of character.

What's wrong with kitsch?

I think we can narrow down the leading candidates for an argument to six: (1) the claim that kitsch and sentimentality provoke excessive or immature expressions of emotion; (2) the claim that kitsch and sentimentality manipulate our emotions; (3) the claim that kitsch and sentimentality express or evoke "false" or "faked" emotions; (4) the claim that kitsch and sentimentality express or evoke "cheap" or "easy" or "superficial" emotions; (5) the claim that kitsch and sentimentality are self-indulgent and interfere with "appropriate" behavior and, perhaps the most dominant charge; (6) the claim that kitsch and sentimentality distort our perceptions and interfere with rational thought and an adequate understanding of the world. The charge is that kitsch gives us a false and fraudulent, overly "sweet" and benign vision of the world (or certain
beings in the world, notably children and puppies) and thus somehow "blocks" our larger, nastier knowledge of the world (children and puppies too). Underlying all of these charges, indeed, is the suspicion that kitsch and sentimentality are modes of distraction and selfdeception, shifting our attention away from the world as it is and soothing us instead with objects that are uncompromisingly comfortable and utterly unthreatening. [...]

If someone responds tenderly to a little girl in a painting, is that not a good indication that they will tend to do so in the case of a real little girl? And if they respond with cold contempt to the painting, isn't that a warning, that this is a person deficient in essential human feelings? However sophisticated we may be, we respond to representational  art as if the subject in question were real and actual and the way we respond to art says a great deal about how we respond to life. It is not self-indulgence that motivates us to absorb ourselves in a painting and welcome the emotions it evokes. It is part of our emotional engagement in the human drama.

Once we remove from consideration those concerns that are appropriate to art and aesthetics rather than ethics, it seems to me that the real objection to kitsch and sentimentality is the rejection (or fear) of emotions and, especially, certain kind of sentiments, variously designated as "tender" or "sweet" or "nostalgic." But the rejection extends as well to the gloomier emotions, and Karsten Harries warns us: "how easy it is to wax lyrical over despair, to wallow in it, to enjoy it. This too is kitsch, sour kitsch." Mary Midgley points out that "thrillers" have much in common with kitsch and sentimentality, for they too distort reality and manipulate emotion (though different emotions and to a very different end). So what emotions are legitimate, "true" and undistorted? Can art evoke any ordinary human emotions without being condemned as kitsch? Is there any room left in our jaded and sophisticated lives for the enjoyment of simple innocence and "sweet" affection? The trumped-up charges against kitsch and sentimentality should disturb us and make us suspicious. These attacks on the most common human sentiments-our reactions to the laughter of a child, or to the death of an infant-go far beyond the rejection of the bad art that evokes them. It is true that such matters provide a facile vehicle for second or third rate painters, but if such incidents are guaranteed to evoke emotion it is because they are indeed a virtually universal concern. The fact that we are thus "vulnerable" may make for some very bad art but this should not provoke our embarrassment at experiencing these quite "natural" sentiments ourselves, nor should it excuse the enormous amount of sophistry that is devoted to making fun of and undermining the legitimacy of such emotion.

Solomon, Robert C. (1991) "On Kitsch and Sentimentality" 
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 49, No. 1, pp. 1-14
Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics

Sunday, 23 January 2011

On D. Libeskind being kitsch

"'Have you seen theTimes yet?' she asked. 'Get it, get it, get it.'

It was early in the morning and I wasn’t quite awake. Yet.

In the Times, it turned out, Herbert Muschamp had offered 'an appraisal' of the two finalists [for the Gound Zero project]. 'Taken together as a kind of shotgun diptych,' he wrote, 'the two designs... illustrate the confusion of a nation torn between the conflicting impulses of war and peace.' Shotgun diptych?

'Daniel Libeskind’s project for the World Trade Center site is a startlingly aggressive tour de force, a war memorial to a looming conflict that has scarcely begun. The THINK team’s proposal, on the other hand, offers an image of peacetime aspirations so idealistic as to seem nearly unrealizable.

'While no pacifist, as a modern-day New Yorker I would like to think my way to a place beyond armed combat. ... [The THINK design] is an act of metamorphosis. It transtforms our collective memories of the twin towers into a soaring affirmation of American values.' [...]

I went back to reading. Muschamp was not remotely finished. He derided my attempt as a 'predictably kitsch result.' Whoa. That’s as low a blow as you can deliver in architecture criticism—to call something kitsch. You can say a design is ugly. That it is impractical. You can even say it’s a rip-off of another design. But don’t ever call it kitsch."

Libeskind, Daniel (2004) Breaking Ground. Adventures in Life and Architecture. New York, Riverhead Books, pp 167-168.
Imagen: futurewire.blogspot.com

Saturday, 15 January 2011

Kitsch (P. Crick)

"It is a surprise to find how, in the biological realm, the endlessly evolving forms of life appear as anticipations of distinctive forms of human social behaviour. Ignorant of the slur which we place upon them and of the effect they have upon our metaphors, parasites such as ivy, mistletoe, or the pernicious flea, pronounce the joys that can be gained just by shaping one's life around the life style of a host. Why struggle for support or food when you can get someone else to do all the hard work for you? Such is the question parasitism suggests. A refutation of the argument is hard to find.

The price which the parasite pays for its upkeep is dependence, but offered such support by a more energetic organism, all else follows. Generally, in the natural world the right degree of maintenance is forthcoming; but should the host die, then the parasite will probably follow suit. The key fact in this sort of relationship is that it is a very one-way affair, and irreversible.

In human culture, a nearly identical partnership is that which holds between Art and Kitsch. They are interinvolved, but in an irreversible mode. Lift, for example, all trace of Kitsch from a society and Art would still be able to flourish. It might, indeed, expand its range and become more successful. Extract, however, Art from the structure of a culture— prise out its nervous system—and, after a sufficient pause, any sign of Kitsch would also vanish. Perhaps in this instance the culture might vanish, too.

What, then, are the characteristics of Kitsch as a phenomenon which define and ensure its dependency on Art as the prior form ? [...]


Firstly, then, a work of art, although always the product of thought and imagination and, of course, very hard work, is not deliberative. The creative artist never sets out to calculate responses, for calculation would inevitably destroy the spontaneous character which enters into the development of the artefact. The creative act, the work of making the poem, the painting, the sculpture, does not preclude reason or reasoning; but the intellect combines with and fuses into the passionate element throughout the process, under a principle which ensures that the completed work will submit itself to an open and diverse response on the part of each differing perceiver. A work of art does not make use of its understanding of the nature of the medium being employed to control the psyche of the responding individual, as is the case in the sophisticated product of advertising on television where Kitsch photography and montage both of shot and of speech are the order of the day. Art does not seek to manipulate. It does not take up a position of power in relation to the recipient, as advertising will. It does not see the properties of the language of the medium as a weapon of approach. The artist is not self-conscious in that sense. Calculation as to effect will always mean that one who does so also calculates the precise reward of that effect. Calculation of effect is also the path to the manifestation of the sentimental. In Kitsch, deliberation and indulgence walk hand in hand, as courtier and courtesan. Flattery is its essence. [...]

Secondly, Art knows nothing of closure. The artefact may sometimes be simple; but it is never simplistic. Art does not insult the complexity of nature and of Man through an act of reduction. Nor is there any finality in a true work of art, either in its internal state, nor when it is experienced from the outside. The completed form of the work, its structural harmony, is a resolution of conflicting forces in the originator—a momentary resolution,
not a terminal fusion of those forces. In its external aspect, the artefact gives the observer or participant work to do. It puts questions, starts a mystery, inseminates the observer with new unforeseen questions, leaves itself open, leaves itself exposed to the world like a flower; all this, while giving delight; whereas a Kitsch product is final in quality, says one borrowed definite thing, and then, no more. It arouses certain secondary pleasures in those who crave Kitsch but asks no questions, is unmysterious and shallowly explicit. Kitsch is very much a by-product of social anxiety, and tries very hard to reassure. It seeks to protect both its maker and its consumer from the rigour of the real. [...]

The third negation of Kitsch is a double negation. Art is never un-selfreferenced. Kitsch, on the other hand, bears the stamp of its own ignorance. Whenever a Kitsch product falsely offers itself as a work of art, analysis of it gives no evidence that the work anywhere knows itself to be a work of art. The authentic work knows itself to be such because the creator of it discovers as he goes along that he is a maker of the new (and not just the maker of a novelty). There is always concrete evidence within a work of art of a technical kind which will show on inspection that not only is the artist engaged in a search but that he is searching with a method which is provisional in its essence. Moreover, this note of provisionality always enters into the expressive form which the act of search takes. Such an attitude shows what it means to assert that a work of art is self-aware. It is just one step beyond this from self-awareness to self-reference. Selfawareness of this tentative order ensures that the work of art will indirectly comment upon its own use of the medium. It will show itself to exist in a state of tension with its own technical means, and its own specific cultural inheritance.

A further aspect of the self-referencing function resides in the fact that a work of art, simply by existing in its 'resolved' state, can be seen by observers to relate both to past works by the same artist, and to those which will emerge in the future. The relationship articulates the general quest of that artist. Kitsch can never exemplify either search or quest in this sense. The third great difference between Art and Kitsch occurs in the sphere
of decoration. Art is not self-indulgently decorative. In a Kitsch product, there is no inner formal necessity between the ornamental element and motif. The decoration is used simply as cosmetic to whatever is being
centrally presented. [...]

The last and fifth major contrastive difference between the two modes of making is to some extent a continuation by other means of the issue of decoration. A work of art, if looked at in terms of its rituahstic aspect, is never ritualistic without substance. The ritualism of Kitsch, however, gives full reign to the resources of human fancy and fantasy without regard to the traditional base of accredited ritual. The authenticity of the ritual domain in Art is derived from its historical validity—the ideological validity of the field of ritual reference at the time at which any given work of art invoking it is made. A work of art can, of course, evoke past ritualistic forms, not (as may be the case) as quotation, but rather in the form of celebrating the climate of a previous epoch and its value-system. But whenever that happens, it will treat the material referred to in the language of the present and not just naively import the ritual mode unaltered. Kitsch imports, and borrows, intact. Art alludes, and transforms. [...]

Today, Kitsch is the flourishing formula of a mass culture. Its presence can be detected in every social practice from religion, through all mediacommercials, to athletics, even. Kitsch is the great hedonist vehicle of our time, a parasite now grown to leviathan maturity, while the host on which it feeds remains comparatively small. But to this depressing fact there is an opposing optimistic parable. In certain Latin American countries, the scourge of extreme poverty has brought into being a type of artistcraftsman, who lacking all plant or technology has taken to recycling chosen items of garbage (Strassenschlamm) into new and beautiful and useful individualized products, such as oil-lamps, which' are sold at local street-markets. They are sold not (yet) to tourists, but to ordinary local people.

This model of creative courage in which an innovation drawn from the uninviting gutter of industrial waste breeds beauty alongside utility, has something in common with the way in which Western artists have taken up facets of the enormous Kitsch output in their own culture and through a deft act of allusive irony incorporated them into fresh aesthetic statements. Modem art therefore engages in a crucial if low-key dialogue with its feverish parasite. On each occasion where that irony is manifested a work of art becomes a work of criticism, and a work of criticism becomes a work of art.

Crick, Philip (1983) "Kitsch". In: British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 23, no. 1.

Wednesday, 5 January 2011

Architecture in Everyday Life (D. Upton)

"The everyday comprises 'seemingly unimportant activities'. Or it is 'a set of functions which connect and join together systems that might appear to be distinct' (Lefebvre) [...].

For one architect, 'The everyday is that which remains after one has eliminated all specialized activities' (Harris). According to another, everyday space lies 'in between such defined and physically definable realms as the home, the workplace, and the institution, [it] is the connective tissue that binds everyday lives together' (Crawford) [...].

Architecture is inescapably concrete and it forms the fabric and the setting of everyday life. Consequently, to approach everyday life through architecture - architecture with a lower-case a, understood in its broadest sense to encompass the entire material world (or "cultural landscape") that people make and think - is to be forced to pin down, in ways too often lacking in theories of the quotidian, the precise ways in which everyday life is experienced and the specifics of its relationships to other aspects of life and landscape. So architecture's materiality makes it a natural conduit to the specificity of everyday life. [...]

Unlike, say, literary critics or sociologists, who study the works, actions, and values of other people at a distance, builders intervene directly in everyday life. This means that architects must examine their own professional practices and social identities as well as those of the people for whom they build. This habit of self-scrutiny long antedated Architectural interest in the everyday, so called. Since the beginnings of European-American professionalization two centuries ago, architects (expanding that term to include landscape architects and urban designers) have struggled to differentiate themselves from builders and clients and to establish a clear social identity that would give them the cultural authority to dominate the building market and control the shaping of the landscape. They have failed. Many nonarchitects - builders, clients, critics - continue to claim some authoritative knowledge of the field and decline to grant architects the absolute authority they seek. [...]

The idea of the everyday forces us to acknowledge that Architecture is part of architecture, that designers are a part of the everyday world, not explorers from a more civilized society or detached doers for clients and to cities."

Upton, Dell (2002) "Architecture in Everyday Life". In: New Literary History, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 707-723. The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Sunday, 2 January 2011

Etymology of Kitsch (O. F. Best)

Three quick notes:

- Kitsch is a synonym of Kolportage (cheap sensationalism / trash, rubbish / peddling).
- Ketschen / schleppen / schleifen : to draw, to tow.
- Kitschen is used as the verbs verpassen and verschwenden (to fritter away / to waste), but also means "to negotiate on a small scale and to sell in an artful way.
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